Political legitimacy is a difficult concept to define. For example, the entry for it in the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy goes on for pages. Francis Fukuyama takes a narrower view, noting that, “legitimacy is a generally accepted set of limits imposed on conflict and change. When the limits are respected, an outcome is perceived to be legitimate.” We take the position that, as US Supreme Court Justice Potter Steward famously said about pornography, while political legitimacy may be hard to define, you know it when you see it – and when you don’t.
In May and September of 2010, The Index Investor published feature articles on what we then called “the growing threat to political legitimacy.” You can download both of them
here.
The story actually begins much earlier. I still remember listening to a speech my father gave, back n 1977 or 1978, when he was sixty. He recounted all the shocks that had hit everyone in the room over the past decade, including the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert Kennedy; the riots at the 1968 Democratic Convention, the election of Richard Nixon, the tremendous shift in the Democratic Party followed by the landslide loss of George McGovern in 1972, Watergate and Nixon’s resignation, the 1973 oil shock, the rise of inflation and how it devastated many people’s standard of living, and the fall of Saigon and shock that the United States had lost a war.
For the generation who thought they had seen it all, after having grown up through the Depression and won World War Two, the events of the past decade had left them stunned and disoriented.
I’ve never forgotten what my father said next. What really worried him that night was two things: the decline of manufacturing in southern New England, and the rise of conspicuous consumption by a generation that, not having been raised on stories of the bitter conflicts that accompanied industrialization or lived through the Depression, could not see it for the “social cancer” it was. His pessimistic conclusion that night was that if things didn’t change, the years ahead were going to get harder and harder for “Joe Middle Income.”
And that, unfortunately, is what has happened over the past 40 plus years.
I have a collection of books that documents different observers’ concerns about the path the country has been on. Here are the ones that were published in the eighties and nineties:
The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations, by Christopher Lasch (1979)
Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, by Hayes and Abernathy (1980)
The Rise and Decline of Nations, by Mancur Olson (1982)
The Closing of the American Mind, by Allan Bloom (1987)
The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, by Paul Kennedy (1987)
The Bonfire of the Vanities, by Tom Wolfe (1987)
The Collapse of Complex Societies, by Joseph Tainter (1988)
Fear of Falling, by Barbara Ehrenreich (1989)
The Politics of Rich and Poor, by Kevin Phillips (1990)
The Overworked American, by Juliet Schor (1991)
Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America, by James Davison Hunter (1991)
Post Modernism: The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, by Frederic Jameson (1991)
Whither the Middle Class? by Duncan and Smeeding (1991)
Populism and Elitism, by Jeffrey Bell (1992)
Boiling Point: Democrats, Republicans, and the Decline of the Middle Class, by Kevin Phillips (1993)
Culture of Complaint: The Fraying of America, by Robert Hughes (1993)
The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy, by Christopher Lasch (1994)
The Good Life and Its Discontents, by Robert Samuelson (1995)
The End Of Affluence: The Causes And Consequences Of America's Economic Dilemma, by Jeff Madrick (1995)
The Overspent American, by Juliet Schorr (1997)
What’s Wrong with Critical Race Theory: Reopening the Case for Middle Class Values, by Daniel Subotnik (1998)
Luxury Fever, by Robert Frank (1999)
One Nation, Two Cultures, by Gertrude Himmelfarb (1999)
Bobos in Paradise, by David Brooks (2000)
Why the White Working Class Still Matters, by Teixeira and Rogers (2000)
Bowling Alone, by Robert Putnam (2000)
The 2000s proved to be a far more tumultuous decade that the 80s or 90s, as we were hit with a series of shocks.
These included Al Gore challenging the legitimacy of the 2000 election outcome in the courts, the 9/11 terrorist attacks (and others in Europe), the exponential increase in globalization and outsourcing of production following China joining the World Trade Organization at the end of 2001, the 2003 Iraq War, the housing boom, and the Great Financial Crisis in 2008.
Throughout the decade, the economic and social challenges facing the middle class continued to worsen and its resentments increased as a rising share of income went to those at the top, and fueled their conspicuous consumption. The elite’s growing contempt for the masses was painfully brought into widespread public view by Barak Obama’s jarring comment about working class voters in old industrial towns during his 2008 campaign for president: “They get bitter, they cling to guns or religion or antipathy to people who aren't like them or anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment as a way to explain their frustrations.”
That was the background for our 2010 analyses of what we termed, “the growing threat to political legitimacy.”
Summary of our 2010 AnalysisIn 2010 we observed that, “It is safe to say that the world economy has entered a period characterized by complex and dangerous dynamics that few people even begin to understand. And even fewer people have tried to think more than a few steps ahead, about where these dynamics may take us, much less what those future scenarios imply for asset allocation and risk management decisions today.
“It goes without saying that any attempt at such thinking is bound to be imperfect, given the complex and evolving nature of the underlying system that is generating the rapid and often confusing changes we see all around us today. Nevertheless, professionals who have been entrusted with the management of other people’s money, and especially those who have a fiduciary duty to their clients, have an obligation to think about these issues” …
“Our current analytical framework is based on the assumption that the world faces four critical and interrelated challenges whose potential effects are non-linear. This makes them both hard to understand, and raises the likelihood that we will underestimate their potential impact and will be surprised by the rapid changes they may cause.
“The first challenge is the fragile nature of the global financial system, in which a very large amount of debt of highly uncertain quality rests on a very thin capital base. On the other side of this equation is the precarious position of many parties that are struggling to repay and/or rollover that debt, including households, some corporations (e.g., commercial property developers), and various levels of government, up to and including some sovereign nations.
“The second challenge is the weakened and imbalanced state of global aggregate demand…
“The third challenge facing the world economy is the risk that developed economies will slip into an extended period of deflation, similar to Japan’s experience since the bursting of its property and equity bubble in 1989…
“The final challenge we face is maintaining the legitimacy of various political institutions that function as control parameters for the global economy and financial markets. These institutions are both international (e.g. rules governing multilateral trade and capital flows) and domestic (e.g., rules governing taxation and redistribution), and face economic and social stresses not seen since in most countries since the 1930s…
“In essence, the “muddling through” scenario assumes that all these challenges will be met, and that the main price we will pay is a prolonged period of slower economic growth (the truly rosy scenario assumes that rising domestic demand in emerging markets will cause them to become the new motor of the world economy, which in turn will return global growth to its previously high levels).
“The downside scenario assumes that we will fail to meet one or more of these challenges, and, given their complex interrelationships and non-linear effects, the result will be an extended period of stagnation whose severity will take many people by surprise…
In our 2010 analysis, we applied different frameworks to better understand the growing political legitimacy crisis.
“Perhaps the best inductive framework has been developed by the Political Instability Task Force, a group of scholars that was originally formed in 1994 and whose work was funded by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (the task force’s public website can be found
here). In their paper “
Modeling Transitions To and From Democracy”, Ulfelder and Lustik summarize the key factors that are associated with these two types of political legitimacy crises (see also, “How to Construct Stable Democracies” by Goldstone and Ufelder).
“This research concludes that increasingly factionalized political competition increases the probability of transition away from democracy. These transitions are also characterized by (1) heightened parochialism (major political parties focus on the interests of a narrow group, rather than nation as a whole); (2) heightened polarization (competition over central authority is increasingly a winner-take-all struggle); and (3) rising mobilization (rival groups begin to pursue their interests through collective action). All of these are amplified by deteriorating economic performance.”
From a deductive perspective, we observed that the growing crisis of political legitimacy could be described as a complex contagion that was driven by causes deeply rooted in our evolutionary past.
“For complex contagions to spread, multiple sources of activation are required. Hence, complex contagions are more likely to spread when individuals in a network observe a new behavior or belief in a significant number of the other individuals to whom they are linked…
“More specifically, two conditions are required for the transmission of a complex contagion.
“First, an individual has to be susceptible to it, in the sense that his or her current behavior or beliefs are not achieving goals or satisfying needs that are important to the individual. Second, a threshold must be met, with a minimum number of other linked individuals adopting the new behavior or belief.
“In the context of the changes in collective beliefs and behavior that triggers a political legitimacy crisis, we believe the susceptibility criterion is ultimately grounded in a sufficient number of people fearing for their future. A person must have a very powerful motivator to question the legitimacy of a political system; only fear can provide that.
“In previous issues, we have written at length about the complex neurobiology of fear, and its relationship to the role played by the amygdala (a primitive part of our brain). To simplify, there are two key primary fear triggers: the experience of uncertainty, and the experience of loss. The latter can be either absolute, as in the loss of resources, or relative, as in the loss of relative social status. Once a primary fear is triggered, people also experience a heightened secondary fear of social isolation. All of these emotional reactions probably increased our ancestors’ chances for survival on the East African plain, and are therefore likely hardwired into us by evolution.
“With respect to the threshold criterion, research has shown that there is a complicated relationship between the emotions triggered by gains and losses and whether these outcomes result from our action or inaction.
“Our emotional reactions to gains and losses, and our preferences for errors of commission and omission, seem to be deeply connected with whether those gains and losses are private or visible to a social group within which we believe our relative social status is important.
“When they know the results of a decision will be private, human beings prefer errors of omission, in order to avoid feeling regret. However, when the results will be public, they prefer errors of commission to avoid feelings of envy (see “
Interdependent Utilities: How Social Ranking Affects Choice Behavior” by Bault, Coricelli, and Rustichini).
“Think of this as a switch from a system dominated by negative feedback to one dominated by positive feedback.
“From this perspective, political legitimacy crises result when a social network passes two critical points: first, feelings of fear arise in a sufficiently large number of people, and second, there is a willingness to go beyond our natural preference for errors of omission rather than errors of commission, because enough socially important individuals to whom we are linked are adopting new beliefs and behaviors.
This is not to say that all situations that pass the susceptibility and social threshold tests will trigger a legitimacy crisis. A full-blown crisis requires that collective action is undertaken not just by isolated local networks of individuals, but by many such networks in parallel. In this regard, modern technology has made this transition much more likely, as it has enabled the creation of vastly more network links, both between local individuals and between local networks themselves. So called “flash mobs” are one example of this, as are the “color revolutions” we have seen in a number of countries in recent years…
“From a social network perspective, more and more people are fearful for their jobs and their futures, and increasingly frustrated by the inability of the political system to respond in a manner that reduces these fears.
“More important, people increasingly realize that many other people in their social networks – and in similar networks around their countries, if not the world – share their fears. The Tea Party movement in the United States is a logical result of this situation, and shows that for a growing number of people, the collective action threshold has been passed.
“However, this still begs the question of the extent to which these growing frustrations and signs of collective action are translating into a growing crisis of political legitimacy.
“In our view, there is evidence that this is, in fact, occurring. For example, a growing number of commentators have noted the sharply widening gap in the United States, and likely in other countries as well, between the views of the elite and the views of the masses.
“For example, the pollster Scott Rasumussen has found that 68% of likely voters “say the political class doesn’t care what most Americans think”, while 84% say that America is headed in the wrong direction. In contrast, 67% of what Rasmussen terms the “political class” thinks America is headed in the right direction (for more of his analysis, see Rasmussen’s recently published book, In Search of Self Governance).
“Peggy Noonan also captured this sentiment in a recent Wall Street Journal column (“
America Is At Risk of Boiling Over”, 6Aug10). She noted that, “The biggest change in my political lifetime is that Americans no longer assume that their children will have it better than they did. This is a huge break with the past, with assumptions and traditions that have shaped us.”
As the following chart shows, Noonan was spot on: